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This paper analyses the reasons for the fluctuations of EU actorness within the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), looking at four different Conferences of Parties (CoP): Rio,
Kyoto, Copenhagen and Durban. It applies the concept of actorness established by Jupille and Caporaso
who propose four criteria that need to be present to be an independent actor: recognition, authority,
cohesion and autonomy. This study claims that EU actorness within UNFCCC improved slightly over
time with decline in Copenhagen. However, one can still not call the EU an actor as powerful as a state.
The main reason for this has been lacking autonomy from member states.
I. Introduction
“Given the nature and magnitude of the challenge,
national action alone is insufficient (...). No region
can insulate itself from these climate changes. That
is why we need to confront climate change within a
global framework, one that guarantees the highest
level of international cooperation.”
Ban Ki-moon
Just as Ban Ki-moon expressed it in thequote above, is has become increasinglyobvious within the last 40 years that envi-
ronmental problems transcend national bound-
aries and can no longer be fought against by
states alone. The theory of the greenhouse ef-
fect, the major cause of climate change, has
been discovered already in the 1890’s (Mc-
Cormick, 2011, p. 280). Yet, the existence of
climate change has been scientifically disputed
for a long time. Nowadays few people deny it
due to proven rising global temperature and
an increasing amount of natural catastrophes.
The extreme weather and melting of the polar
ice caps in the beginning of the 21st century
made climate change a topic of global public
and political concern (Vogler, 2011, p. 356).
Vogler and many more experts even argue that
climate change has been the most important
issue ever faced by humankind (p. 348).
If as noted above climate change cannot
be fought against by single states, then also a
group of states like the EU is inefficient, be-
cause for a global problem global action is re-
quired. Therefore, during the Rio Summit of
1992, the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was cre-
ated to unite all countries for the fight against
emissions. By now it is one of the most multi-
faceted system of international environmental
governance. Albeit the EU’s organizational
problems and lacking coherence, it managed
to acquire a leading role in the development
of the climate change regime (Vogler, 2011, p.
349).
However, the EU leadership within UN-
FCCC has not been constant but went through
many changes. It is especially interesting to
investigate the changing role of the EU, since
it is not a state but a union of countries, which
can however be very powerful. This paper ana-
lyzes the reasons for the shifting EU actorness,
looking at four different Conferences of Parties
(CoP): Rio, Kyoto, Copenhagen and Durban. It
applies the concept of actorness established by
Jupille and Caporaso who propose four criteria
that need to be present to be an independent
actor: recognition, authority, cohesion and au-
tonomy. This study claims that EU actorness
within UNFCCC improved slightly over time
with decline in Copenhagen. However, one can
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still not call the EU an actor as powerful as a
state. The main reason for this has been lack-
ing autonomy from member states. However,
this study bears limits as to the used theory
and depth of analysis.
Firstly, this paper introduces the actorness
theory of Jupille and Caporaso. Afterwards,
the relationship between EU institutions and
member states are elaborated upon. Secondly,
EU actorness at the four above-mentioned con-
ferences (Rio, Kyoto, Copenhagen and Durban)
is discussed. Thirdly, the development of EU
actorness over the years is lined out. Before the
conclusion, limitations of the used theory are
discussed.
II. Theoretical Background
This chapter introduces the theory of actorness
as well as the interaction and power-relations
between the EU institutions and national gov-
ernments in European politics. The notion of
actorness matters, because it outlines the effec-
tiveness of the EU in international relations. It
may not directly cause effectiveness, but actor-
ness is an important pre-condition for being
active and successful in international relations.
I. The Concept of Actorness
Already in the 1960’s the notion of actorness de-
veloped as a response to an increase of other ac-
tors than states in international relations. Sjöst-
edt (1977) defined actorness as "the ability to
function actively and deliberately in relation
to other actors in the international system" (p.
16). Over the years two main streams of ac-
torness emerged. Bretherton and Vogler use
three criteria: presence, opportunity and capa-
bility. However, these are known to be broad
and problematic to measure empirically. That
is why for this study the theory of Jupille and
Caporaso (1998) is being used, who developed
criteria for measuring the observable and con-
tinuously altering interactions of the EU in in-
ternational relations.
The first criterion, Recognition, is the min-
imum condition needed to be present in the
global political sphere. Generally, it is about
the "acceptance of and interaction with the en-
tity by others" (p. 214). De jure, the EU is not
automatically recognized, because it is not a
state. Therefore, it needs formal membership
in an international organization, which is of-
ten only relucantly granted. De facto, however,
as soon as a third party cooperates with the
EU instead or on top of cooperating with one
or more EU member states, one can say that
the EU fulfills recognition. The more the EU
collaborates with other states, the more it gets
socialized and accepted thus creates its own
identity (p. 215).
Authority, the second criterion, is the EU’s
"legal competence to act" (p. 214). This is built
via member states that delegate authority to the
EU institutions, mostly in form of treaties (p.
216). Naturally, the EU actorness is strongest
when operating under exclusive competence
(Pedro do Coutto, 2010, p. 98).
The third criterion, Autonomy, is traced by
institutional distinctiveness and independence,
especially from other actors like states. This in-
dependence is visible by unrestricted goal for-
mation, own decision-making and autonomous
implementation. However, it is difficult to
guess the EU’s autonomy, as there are many
ways that member states can have influence,
for example through the Council of Ministers
or the working committees of the Commis-
sion. In the field of environmental negotia-
tions, there are also many "negotiations-within-
a-negotiation", because often no one has the
sole competence for implementation (Jupille
& Caporaso, 1998, p. 218). The next section
explains more about it.
As last criterion, Cohesion describes "the de-
gree to which an entity is able to formulate
and articulate internally consistent policy pref-
erences" (p. 214). Because the EU is more than
a regime and less than a federation, an indica-
tor for cohesion needs to be proper to this level.
The EU is very complex, thus it can also act
with changing degrees of cohesion. Horizon-
tal conflicts between different member states
or EU institutions as well as vertical conflicts
between the EU institutions and member states
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can threaten cohesion and if such clashes are
present, the EU is less capable of acting (p.
219).
II. The Relationship between EU In-
stitutions and Member States
This section gives a short overview of how EU
institutions and member states interact, since
this influences the EU’s actorness and auton-
omy.
Member states have always played a very
important role in EU politics. They not only
represent their national aims in the European
Council and Intergovernmental Conferences,
but also in lower committee structures. Besides
that, they are key actors for the implementation
of all policies in their country. Over the time,
EU treaties made Qualitative Majority Voting
the major voting system, taking away some of
the power of states. However, the most impor-
tant decisions are taken unanimously by the
Heads of States, making them very powerful.
Nowadays, EU competences in different policy
fields are exclusive, shared or supportive. Only
with exclusive competence the EU has the right
to act without the agreement of member states.
There is an on-going debate whether EU in-
tegration leads to a more intergovernmental
or more supranational union. The field of cli-
mate change is a shared competence, leading
to an influential position of member states in
all issues related (Nugent, 2010).
One sees that member states are of high
importance for European politics and interna-
tional negotiations. Thus, this paper takes into
account this aspect while analysing the EU’s
actorness in the following chapters.
III. EU Actorness at UNFCCC
Conferences
This chapter analyses EU actorness at the four
mentioned UNFCCC conferences. It does so by
first summarizing the content of each confer-
ence and then applying one after another the
four criteria of actorness.
I. The Beginning: The Earth Summit
in Rio
The following section analyses the EU’s perfor-
mance as an actor at the Earth Summit, known
as the first global summit about sustainable
development.
The UN Conference on Environment and
Development, also called Earth Summit, took
place in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. One of the
important outcomes was the establishment of
UNFCCC, entering into force in 1995 and mark-
ing the start of the international climate change
regime (Vogler, 2011, p. 364). For the EU, it has
been argued, is the presence in Rio a relevant
case for investigating its function in global en-
vironmental negotiations (Jupille & Caporaso,
1998, p. 221). Therefore, this analysis starts
with the EU’s performance in Rio.
The EU outlined its strong opinion on
achieving timetables and targets for emission
reductions already before the start of the con-
ference. It aimed at establishing credibility
through leadership by example. Setting such
high goals contributed to its recognition by
others states and organisations (Vogler, 2011,
pp. 361-364). Officially, the EU had the non-
voting viewer status within the UN framework,
but the EU started questioning this, since it
received further competences in the field of cli-
mate change through the Single European Act
(SEA) (Uldall Heidener, 2011, p. 7). During
the preparatory meeting of the Rio conference
it has been disputed, but in the end there was
an agreement by the UN General Assembly
that the EU receives full participatory status
as a Regional Economic Integration Organisa-
tion (REIO), thus having the same rights as
member states (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p.
222). This goes in line with the general as-
sumption that the EU is more than an inter-
national organization, because it develops law
that is directly binding for its member states
(McCormick, 2011, p. 263).
A milestone for European authority in exter-
nal relations was the ERTA (European Agree-
ment on Road Transport) Case 22/70 in 1971. It
laid foundation for the Commission’s capabil-
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ity to represent the whole EU in international
environmental negotiations in fields where in-
ternal environmental policy competence was
reached (Vogler, 2011, p. 353). However, even
though ERTA supported EU’s authority, shared
competences for final decisions disrupted its
actorness. Climate change, for example, is
a field of shared competences and therefore
requiring signatures of both the EU and its
member states (Rhinard & Kaeding, 2006, p.
1204). Not only climate change was discussed
in Rio, also topics, which vary from shared
to exclusive competences were touched, such
as development aid, biodiversity and forest re-
sources, (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 221). In
order to prevent chaos, the Council decided
that in exclusive areas the Commission would
represent and negotiate, whereas in mixed ar-
eas it is the Council Presidency (Sbragia, 1997,
p. 28). However, this could not circumvent
an ambiguous and vague behaviour in mixed
areas of competence (Jupille & Caporaso, 1992,
p. 222).
Concerning institutional distinctiveness, the
EU was very present in Rio due to its big dele-
gation, but the Commission President Jaques
Delors could not enjoy the same acceptance as
the US President. Additionally, important fig-
ures like Ken Collins, chairperson of European
Parliament Environment Committee, and Envi-
ronment Commissioner Carlo Ripo di Meana
were not present, because of several frustra-
tions with the conference beforehand. That
is why all in all the institutional distinctive-
ness of the EU was weaker than it could have
been (pp. 223-226). Also the independence was
fragile, since mixed agreements needed to be
established.
What contributed to cohesion was the Por-
tuguese presidency’s smooth cooperation with
the Commission that was supported by the
clear separation of tasks (Brinkhorst, 1994,
p. 613). Before the conference, a UN Gen-
eral Assembly resolution asked for national
reports. The EU handed in a common report
produced by the Commission, showing con-
sistency (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 1992). This convincing and uniting
report was supported by several policies of
member states about the reduction of green-
house gas emissions and also had a strong
impact on the powerful position of the Com-
mission during the conference (Mc Cormick,
2011, p. 281). However, there were horizontal
disagreements between EU Member States, for
example whether a carbon tax should be part
of the UN framework or not. Other difficulties
hindering higher policy goals were concerns
about loss of sovereignty, the disagreement of
powerful industries, struggle to fairly allocate
emission-abatement among member states and
the disappointment about countries like the US.
Consequently some member states also created
their own national plans (pp. 283-284).
At the Earth Summit one could observe
a certain degree of actorness of the EU. All
factors were present, but in very diverging de-
grees due to control of member states (Uldall
Heidener, 2011, p. 10). Nonetheless, for the fact
that it was the first big meeting in this political
field, the EU showed a strong presence and
a well-prepared action. The following section
shows how EU actorness developed in Kyoto
five years later.
II. Kyoto - on the Way to a Binding
Agreement
This section analyses the actions of the EU at
the third Conference of the Parties (CoP) in Ky-
oto from the perspective of the EU’s actorness.
The CoP3 in Kyoto in 1997 managed to pro-
duce a binding protocol and marked a quali-
tative shift from emission stabilisation to emis-
sion reduction. The EU’s initial proposal of
a cut by 15% of all developed countries was
blocked by states that export oil, but it achieved
a deal on targets and timetables among the de-
veloped countries: 7% the US, 6% Japan and 8%
EU countries. An agreement could be reached
that "using the baseline of 1990, a set of differ-
entiated emissions targets would be achieved
by the first commitment period, 2008-2012"
(Vogler, 2011, p. 366). First opposing it, the
EU finally accepted the flexibility mechanism
proposed by the US. The ratification endured
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seven years and the Kyoto Protocol entered
into force in 2007. By then it was proven that
even if the Kyoto targets were met, this would
not significantly help to fight climate change
(ibid.).
The de jure recognition of the EU was
proven in 1992 with the adoption of the UN-
FCCC, when it became an official member as a
REIO. Therefore, since Rio, de jure recognition
did not change (Vogler, 2002, p. 5). De facto
recognition was present, because big nations
like the US or Japan interacted with the EU
just as with other states. In Kyoto. for the first
time in history of UNFCCC, the final negotia-
tions were held between the US, Japan and the
EU (Mühleck, 2010, p.14). Also article 4 of the
Kyoto Protocol "allowed the EU and its mem-
ber states to meet their targets jointly through
a different commitment among the member
states" (McCormick, 2011, p. 288). This bold
statement is a clear sign of recognition.
Formal authority did not alter since Rio
(Uldall Heidener, 2011, p. 11). The Maastricht
Treaty increased provisions of the Single Euro-
pean Act (SEA) by mentioning sustainable de-
velopment, introducing majority voting in this
area and establishing the European Environ-
mental Agency. All this strengthened the EU’s
focus on environmental issues as such, but
did not influence the EU’s authority to bargain
within the UNFCCC (Mühleck, 2010, p. 12).
One major change from Rio to Kyoto was that
Kyoto dealt exclusively with climate change,
an area of shared competence, which resulted
in member states refusing to give the Commis-
sion a negotiation mandate (Groenleer & Van
Schaik, 2007, p. 985). This had a big influence
on the negotiating power of the EU. In addition,
constantly changing Council Presidencies ham-
pered the development of a long-term strategy
and stability (Lacasta, Dessai & Powroslo, 2002,
p. 370). Contrary, high-level advice of the Eu-
ropean Commission to the Presidency proved
that the EU enjoyed at least informal authority
(Uldall Heidener, 2011, p. 12).
Regarding institutional distinctiveness, the
EU had a small delegation lacking the Com-
mission President and Head of State of Lux-
embourg holding the Presidency, but the Com-
missioner for Environment and Environment
Minister of Luxembourg were on spot. This
caused weak autonomy of the EU (p. 14).
There were several problems of independence
of the EU: Since the Council Presidency rep-
resented the EU, the member states wanted
to have as much control as possible. Besides
that, it took hours of negotiations to build a
new mandate. Such long discussions caused
delayed decision-making and lost time in daily
coordinating meetings (Mühleck, 2010, pp. 12-
13).
It was the EU’s aim to have a common
agreement ready prior to Kyoto in order to
strengthen its cohesion (Oberthür, 2006, p. 68).
Therefore, preparing for Kyoto, the Environ-
ment Council Meeting in March 1997 consid-
ered a 15% reduction of CO2 emission using
1990 as a base. This meeting decided on the
"burden sharing agreement", which sets out
different reduction targets for different states
(McCormick, 2011, p.284). This agreement
also made the EU to the major leader in Ky-
oto showing tactical cohesion (Oberthür, 2006,
p. 68). Also horizontal cohesion was present,
since member states increasingly followed the
common voice of the Council (Uldall Heidener,
2011, p. 14). This in turn lead to a decline in
negotiating parties, gave more power to the EU
and made it possible to achieve concessions
from Japan and the US and supported strong
outcomes in Kyoto (Oberthür, 2006, p. 69).
The actorness of the EU in Kyoto was
stronger than in Rio, though still not en-
tirely developed. The European Union could
develop its external representation through
strong recognition, authority and cohesion.
Only the autonomy was weak due to a small
delegation and independence problems. The
next chapter shows how the EU behaved as
an actor during the Copenhagen conference in
2009.
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III. Copenhagen - the Decline of EU
Actorness
This section focuses on the famous CoP15 in
Copenhagen and analyses the behaviour and
internal relations of the EU.
Copenhagen 2009 was the UNFCCC confer-
ence towards which most expectations existed.
The election of Barack Obama, who promised
to take climate change seriously, gave hope to
a successful summit. The objective of Copen-
hagen was to develop a "comprehensive, am-
bitious, fair, science-based and legally binding
global treaty" (Vogler, 2011, p. 370). Before-
hand, the EU supported its leading role by
proposing a unilateral offer of 20% emission re-
duction by 2020, increasing up to 30% if other
developed countries joined. On top of that,
the EU promised a funding of EUR 7,2 bil-
lion for achieving the targets of less developed
countries. In contrast to these promising expec-
tations, the slow progress of the UN working
groups already showed that these goals would
be hard to achieve. In the end, Copenhagen
was a big disenchantment for the EU. The so-
called ’Copenhagen accord’ was not legally
binding and only noted instead of adopted. It
also did not include any binding emission tar-
gets and no agreement on replacing Kyoto (pp.
370-371).
The formal recognition in Copenhagen was
just as before - the REIO membership of the
UNFCCC (Uldall Heidener, 2011, p. 16). How-
ever, one major difference was the presence of
the European heads of states during the final
decision-making. This particularly influenced
the informal recognition of the EU. On the
lower levels of negotiation, the EU was highly
accepted. Commission officials observed that
the EU was seen as a strong and competent
negotiator that was approached as a whole
instead of the member states. Additionally,
NGOs recognized the EU as one actor dur-
ing formal and informal meetings. However,
once the final decision-making came closer and
heads of states entered the field, this recogni-
tion decreased (p. 17). One main reason for
this shift was the isolation of leaders from the
UK, France and Germany, who often spoke
for themselves. Therefore, also the Swedish
Prime Minister, at that time leading the Coun-
cil Presideny, lost the position to represent the
EU, since he was often left out (Groen & Nie-
mann, 2010, p. 13). Not even the attendance
of Commission President Barroso changed the
situation (Uldall Heidener, 2011, p.18). In a
leaking audio report it was proven that the
three leaders negotiated for the EU during a
highly important informal meeting ("Kopen-
hagen Protokolle", 2010).
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
which stated climate change as of one of the
priorities of the EU and created the new DG
CLIMA (DG Climate Action) and a separate
DG Energy, gave hope to increased EU author-
ity (Vogler, 2011, p. 372). However, the formal
authority was restrained just as in Kyoto, since
the Council Presidency had the mandate to
speak instead of the Commission (Lacasta et al.,
2002, p. 368). Generally, the Commission im-
proved its standing from Kyoto to Copenhagen,
because it was added to the Troika in 2001 (Ul-
dall Heidener, 2011, p. 18). The Irish Pres-
idency in 2004 introduced issue leaders and
lead negotiators which consist of member state-
and Commission officials representing the EU
on behalf of the Council Presidency. Informally,
those leaders managed to become leading ne-
gotiators during the conference (Oberthür &
Roche Kelly, 2008, p. 38). On the other hand,
the same problem with the heads of state ex-
isted as for recognition: Sarkozy, Merkel and
Blair were taking over the authority role from
the Troika ("Kopenhagen Protokolle", 2010).
With regards to institutional distinctiveness
of the EU during CoP15, the Commission had a
comparatively good representation with many
experts who were also leading some negotia-
tions (Uldall Heidener, 2011, p. 21). In practice,
the EU representatives could only held very
reserved and supported negotiations, because
cohesional disparities between member states
lead a fragile independence of the EU insitu-
tions from its member states (p. 30). This
lacking autonomy contributed to the failure
of the EU to adopt its preliminary stratagem.
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Also, the fact that the US, China, India, Brazil
and South Africa lead the negotiations of the
Copenhagen Accord, with only very small in-
fluence of the EU, underlines the EU’s lacking
autonomy to keep its leadership position (Ul-
dall Heidener, 2011, p. 23).
As mentioned above, missing cohesion
played a role of upmost importance for the
EU’s actorness in Copenhagen. The 2007 en-
largement made coherence and quick action
more difficult, since the Union was "capable of
moving only at the speed of the slowest mem-
ber state" (Vogler, 2011, p. 353). Merkel, Brown
and Sarkozy speaking in their own national
opinion ruined the EU’s cohesion (p. 372). Be-
fore the conference there was horizontal co-
hesion between the member states with the
common goal of a determined climate agree-
ment that would replace Kyoto in 2012 and
safeguard the EU’s leadership (Groen & Nie-
mann, 2010, p. 10). Unfortunately, this was
only on the surface overshadowing internal
disputes about the outcome (Vogler, 2011, p.
371). Since new member states were anxious
to be obliged to spend more than they can,
further controversial topics were forestry and
climate funding for developing nations. As
a result, the EU mandate was not strong and
lacking a clear financing agreement (Groen &
Niemann, 2010, p. 12). Also vertical cohesion
was problematic. Member states like Poland
and Estonia were clearly against binding re-
duction targets, since coal is their main energy
supply, whereas the Commission was a leading
advocate of it ("Negotiators at Climate Talks",
2009).
In conclusion, the actorness of the EU in
Copenhagen was weak in comparison to prior
conferences. Whilst at Kyoto European states
were eager on referring powers to the EU, the
contrast was happening in Copenhagen. The
lacking cohesion had an unfavourable effect on
autonomy and overall a strong negative impact
on actorness. Even the fact that for the first
time in UNFCCC history heads of state were
present, did not help to strengthen the out-
come, but worsened it. The following chapter
informs about the latest UNFCCC conference
in Durban in the end of 2011 and the changes
in EU actorness it brought about.
IV. Durban - Roadmap to full EU Ac-
torness and a Better Future?
This section introduces the latest CoP17 in Dur-
ban, which is known for its success. It will
be discussed how far the EU’s actorness was
present in this conference.
After the disappointment of Copenhagen
and a promising CoP in Cancún in 2010, the
CoP17 in Durban in December 2011 was hoped
to find a follow-up mechanism once Kyoto
would expire in 2012. Durban was named a
success due to the establishment of the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action, suggested by
the EU, outlining a legal framework that re-
quires climate combat by all parties until 2015.
This was historic, since for the first time an
agreement was worked on that. Furthermore,
it decided on a second commitment period of
the Kyoto Protocol, to fill the gap until 2015,
and put into operation the Green Climate Fund
for developing nations ("Durban Conference",
2011).
The EU, after many years of being one of
the main negotiators during UNFCCC negoti-
ations, has been fully recognized as an actor
in Durban. The International Institute for Sus-
tainable Development (IISD), one of the major
reporting NGOs reporting on international cli-
mate negotiations, always refers in their earth
bulletin to the EU and never to single Mem-
ber States of the Union. This shows that they
recognized them as an independent actor and
also acknowledged their one voice ("Durban
Highlights December 3", 2011). Furthermore,
the EU was recognized as a good ally by the
African Group, Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS), and Least Developed Countries (LDC)
during the final negotiations (Schwägerl, 2011).
Legally and concerning the EU’s authority
nothing has altered since Copenhagen, since no
change in EU treaty took place and also the sta-
tus of the EU at UNFCCC negotiations stayed
the same. Thus, the EU in form of the Polish
EU Presidency had the mandate to speak on be-
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half of all member states. It was observable that
the EU acted as an autonomous player. The EU
spoke with one voice and together with Cyprus
made a very important amendment to Annex
I, including Cyprus in it (Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, 2012). During the final
days of the conference, both the EU Commis-
sioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard
as well as the Polish Minister of Environment,
Marcin Korolec, spoke on behalf of the EU
confirming their view that a roadmap leading
to a globally binding agreement was needed
("Durban Highlights December 6", 2011).
In the EU negotiations leading to Durban,
there have been some internal divisions be-
tween member states caused by the financial
crisis and different priorities single states had.
There have been those being in favor of very
high emission targets (30%) due to establish-
ing future technologies, establishing local jobs
and global reputation for the EU (e.g. UK, Ger-
many, Denmark) whereas especially Poland
holding the Presidency supported lower tar-
gets to prevent high costs for industry and
consumers (Netzer & Gouverneur, 2011, p. 17).
However, those differences did not hinder the
EU to put forward a common standpoint before
the CoP 17 in Durban started: The EU strongly
believed that an ambitious, comprehensive and
legally binding global climate change treaty
which engages all major economies is needed
("Climate change", 2011). They proposed a
roadmap stating that until 2015 binding tar-
gets would be achieved which then come into
force by 2020. This proposal in the end turned
into the main outcome of the conference. On
top of that, during the opening speeches, Ger-
many, Belgium, France and many more coun-
tries stated their association with the EU’s po-
sition. This is a clear sign for goal cohesion.
In the final part of the conference, according
to IISD, the EU kept to their initial goal of the
roadmap and confirmed again strong cohesion
("Durban Highlights December 5", 2011).
To sum up, even though there have been
some internal conflicts before the conference,
the EU has shown developed actorness during
CoP17 in Durban. All four criteria were ful-
filled and the EU showed a strong leading pres-
ence during these climate negotiations. Polish
Environment Minister Marcin Korolec put the
outcomes into fitting words: "That is a signif-
icant success of the Polish presidency of the
EU Council together with the European Com-
mission, the European Union and the global
community as a whole” ("EU Council Conclu-
sions", 2012).
IV. Development of EU Actorness
The upcoming lines develop a hypothesis on
patterns of EU actorness that advanced be-
tween 1992 and 2011 at those four investigated
UNFCCC conferences. Looking at the four as-
semblies and changes in actorness, one sees
that the EU actorness generally improved over
time, interrupted by an intermezzo in Copen-
hagen.
As the prior analysis has shown, there is
no conference where all criterions of actorness
have been entirely fulfilled. Even though Dur-
ban came very close, there were internal dif-
ferences between member states that during
preparations hindered unity (Netzer & Gou-
verneur, 2011, p, 17). This shows that even
though the EU had full participatory status at
UNFCCC conferences, it still could not reach
the same actorness that states have. However,
over time it came closer to being an actor and
only the conference in Copenhagen interrupted
this positive development. This tendency can
be connected to the deepening of European
economic and political integration over the last
20 years, with treaty changes favoring EU actor-
ness and intensifying the one European voice.
The first criterion recognition did not alter
much over time. Since the EU received the
status of a Regional Economic Integration Or-
ganization (REIO) and thus full participatory
status already before the Earth Summit in Rio
in 1992, the EU has been positively recognized
from the beginning of UNFCCC (Jupille & Ca-
poraso, 1998, p. 222). In the upcoming decades
this status did not change and the EU was ac-
cepted as a valuable negotiating partner. Only
in Copenhagen did the presence of European
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heads of states weaken its recognition, since
the EU lost its common standing and started to
be increasingly fragmented (Uldall Heidener,
2011, p.18). Connected to the developments
mentioned above, also the authority of the Eu-
ropean Union stayed over the four conferences
mostly constant, with a slightly positive devel-
opment. With the ERTA case in 1971 the EU
gained legal power to represent its member
states externally where internal competences
were reached. However, at this point themes
discussed were mainly shared competences
(e.g. climate), which caused a vague behaviour
due to divided abilities. Treaty changes of
Maastricht and Lisbon put climate change as a
topic more strongly on the agenda, but the lack
of negotiating power because of missing man-
dates and shared competences overshadowed
the positive treaty changes (Mühleck, 2010, p.
12). In Durban the Presidency had the mandate
to talk on behalf of the EU, which lead to posi-
tive authority at this conference. Hence, posi-
tive and negative features constantly marked
the progress of the EU’s authority.
The weakest criterion of EU’s actorness has
been its autonomy. Throughout UNFCCC his-
tory the EU suffered from not being a state
and being highly dependent on its member
states. Additionally, the size and composition
of the delegation had a high impact on the au-
tonomy, since it changed the power relations
between institutions and people. When the
Presidency was well represented, it automati-
cally gained momentum, the same for Commis-
sion or Heads of States. Due to powerful Pres-
idencies and Heads of States in Copenhagen
was the EU’s (Commission’s) autonomy per-
sistently weak, whereas Durban showed one
autonomous player with a common goal and
voice (Groen & Niemann, 2010, p.29).
The EU’s cohesion fluctuated immensely
over time, which in turn influenced the actor-
ness as such. In Rio cohesion was mixed, since
there were positive common goals and smooth
cooperation between the Commission and Por-
tuguese Presidency, while horizontal disagree-
ments between member states about details
existed (Brinkhorst, 1994, p.613). With the "bur-
den sharing agreement" presented in Kyoto,
the EU showed strong consistency, which made
it to one of the major leaders of this conference
(Oberthür, 2006, p.68). The EU Eastern enlarge-
ment in 2007 however influenced negatively
European unity, since they could only move as
fast as the ’slowest’ member state, which also
caused many horizontal and vertical conflicts
("Negotiators at Climate Talks", 2009). Two
years later in Durban the EU could overcome
prior internal divisions and achieved its pro-
posed road map by sharing the same aim and
goal. Hence, the member states interests had a
strong influence on the EU’s cohesion.
To sum up, this study has shown that EU
actorness at UNFCCC conferences improved
over time, but only slowly and with many fluc-
tuations. Table 1 serves as a visual summary
of this research. One can observe the strong
influence member states have on this develop-
ment. Following, the willingness of member
states to transfer rights and power to the EU
is the main condition for achieving actorness
within UNFCCC.
V. Limitations of this Study
Based on this research, not all arguments can
be included into the theory of actorness by
Jupille and Caporaso. The authors themselves
claim that the assessment of the EU’s role in
global politics creates many pragmatic chal-
lenges, due to problems of definition, changing
interests of Member states and quick transfor-
mations in world affairs (Jupille & Caporaso,
1998. p.213). Even though one can find pat-
terns fitting into this theory, one should not
forget the importance of influence the differ-
ent criteria have on each other. Additionally,
it is challenging to decide which criterion is
of which importance. The used theory is a
good framework for a short study like this,
but for having a deeper analysis of this topic,
one should develop or set new measurements.
On top of that, to have a complete study, one
would need to go more into the internal level
of member states and EU institutions, which
was out of the scope of this study. Generally, it
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is complex to analyze behavior from the out-
side without knowing from first hand internal
developments. Therefore further research on
this topic would be appropriate.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has shown that the EU’s actorness
at UNFCCC conferences has improved slightly
over time, but was constantly dependent on the
member states’ willingness to transfer powers
to the EU and to support a shared vision and
goal. Therefore it supports the claim, that the
EU can only be an actor on its own, if member
states support the EU on this way by cooperat-
ing instead of following their own path. This
strong member state’s influence has been visi-
ble throughout the four investigated UNFCCC
conferences.
As this analysis has demonstrated, the four
criteria used in the theoretical framework of
Jupille and Caporaso developed into different
directions between the Earth Summit in Rio
in 1992 and the latest UNFCCC CoP17 in Dur-
ban. Recognition stayed nearly constantly pos-
itive, since the granting of full participatory
status to the EU as a Regional Economic Inte-
gration Organization (REIO) in 1992 laid the
legal recognition basis that did not alter over
the years. Only in Copenhagen recognition de-
creased due to the presence of heads of states
who took over the leadership from the EU. Also
the EU’s authority stayed persistently mediocre
and only improved in Durban. Shared compe-
tences as well as missing mandates explain
such average authority of the EU. The auton-
omy was the weakest criterion throughout the
conferences, supporting the claim that the of-
ten missing institutional distinctiveness of the
EU and active control by member states were
major reasons for the EU’s fragile actorness.
From Rio to Copenhagen the autonomy was
very fragile, but Durban proved the opposite.
The cohesion of the EU was highly fluctuating,
since cooperation between different Presiden-
cies and the Commission altered and also the
EU enlargement brought additional burdens to
the one European voice. Copenhagen showed
most cohesion difficulties, due to the Eastern
enlargement and a lacking common goal.
To sum up, the general increase of EU ac-
torness within UNFCCC conferences is a posi-
tive development that also went hand in hand
with further economic and political integration.
It remains to be seen whether current devel-
opments and the Eurozone crisis will lead to
further integration or disintegration and how














1Figure 1: Development EU Actorness at UNFCCC Conferences
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